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He is The Magic Man! Then, something happens. A frighteningly possible story. Once she learned how to Tap the Reservoir, that invisible omniscience, the Source of all creation, Norma Locker's life was transformed from a mean-spirited, neurotic hypochondriac. She had discovered the key which unlocked the treasure chest of her universe.

She felt as though she was living a charmed life as miracles began to manifest in her life and that of her family. Mary, the main character, encounters an unknown being, who is introduced to her as a so called healer. This healer is very different and continues to talk to Mary. Mary soon realizes that there is something quite different about Charles and she soon ends her friendship.

The rejection of that one Encounter will lead to depths of Biblical proportion that Mary could not even imagine. As her faith is tested and her life takes an extreme turn for the worse, she finds allies who never leave her side and twists and turns in her belief system. It is only when her winding road comes to an end that she finds a surprise for her alone.

Socrates now is a wiser and more cynical investigator. And that is where Socrates' problems begin as Socrates, skeptical at first of the old woman's powers, soon learns the hard way that her dire prophecies sometimes have a disquieting and deadly way of coming true. Author Website: www. Morgin is trapped in the Kingdom of Dreams where he meets Rhiannead, Rhianne's alterego in the world of dreams. Rhianne is held captive in Durin by Valso, but when she sleeps she finds herself in the Kingdom of Dreams, seeing Morgin through Rhiannead's eyes.

A red alert on the proven damages of vaccines, and the push to force your family to take them. A short read for a quick grasp of the vaccine fraud, so you can refer this shocker to your disbelieving friends. A painful…but necessary…awakening. The Owl and The Gargoyle is a story of two oddly different creatures who, through a chance meeting, discover their individuality.

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The tale shows us that regardless of who we are, we need to find ourselves and embrace our own unique talents. They learn that their perceived flaws are their best assets and how to best use these characteristics to their advantage and to help others. Phone: Email: Send us an email. Our Author Catalog. Author Catalog. Search Catalog. Search: Enter search keywords. Enter the model of the vehicle. If multiple authors enter comma delimited list. We Work for You. Get Started Today! Latest Blog Posts.

Leave Me Alone! As the example illustrates, Aristotle does not in the first instance focus on cases in which one event causes another the situation taken as typical for the analysis of causality at least since hume , and the extension of his analysis of efficient causality to such cases is somewhat difficult. But to the extent that Aristotle does take account of cases in which events cause events, one important difference between him and us is that Aris- totle employs nothing like a principle of inertia, to the effect that once something is set in motion it will continue to move until something stops it.

Rather, for Aristotle, the motion that causes another motion is exactly contemporaneous with it: the hand that pushes the book along the table is acting causally for precisely as long as the book is moving, and when the hand stops, the book stops. This model of causality which we think of as motion modified by the effect of friction gives Aristotle and his successors trouble over projectile motion, which Aristotle tried to explain, to his own dissatisfaction, by an aerodynamic theory in which the projectile causes eddies in the air that push the projectile along as it moves.

Later books of the Physics deal with temporal and spatial continuity and with theology. The proof is based on a causal principle: motion requires an efficient cause. This sets up a regress of efficient causes that must, Aristotle thinks, be stopped by at least one first efficient cause or unmoved mover there could be many, but Aristotle prefers one as the simpler hypothesis.

The contemporaneity Aristotle demands of efficient causal action with its effect has an impor- tant corollary here: the first cause of the motion in the universe does not precede that motion but goes along with it. This is the element that composes the heavens. The treatise appears to be relatively early, and comes as close as anything in Aristotle to adhering to the syllogistic model that dominated the Posterior Analytics.

Despite its title, its last two books deal with sublunary bodies and with the four elements — here Aristotle unhesitatingly so refers to them — once again. The four books of the badly titled Meteorology the Greek is much vaguer, and has no proper English translation cover such things as comets, the nature of the sea, and chemistry, as well as winds, rain, and lightning.

A plant has a soul that enables it to grow and reproduce; an animal one that enables it to do that much and also to move around and perceive; a human being has one that enables it to do all that as well as think. Book II contains an analysis of perception. What we hear of it virtually all has to do with taxonomy, and this plays a large role in Aristotle as well. There is a description of the development of the chick embryo in Historia Animalium VI 3 of remark- able accuracy that must have involved a great number of dissections and observations.

But in the same work, in II 3. No doubt a research group embarking on the task of codifying the enormous amount of informa- tion to be found in the Aristotelian biological works is going to include a certain amount of misinformation as well. The eye is composed of transparent material so that it can take on colors. The final cause is at the same time the essence of the organ, its formal cause: what it is, is an eye, and what an eye is, is an organ for seeing. For the organ to fulfil its function certain demands are made on the material the eye-material must be transparent , but the matter makes demands back: transparent liquid, which is better for the purpose than air, which is very difficult to contain, still requires a cer- tain sort of container.

And the matter may, independently of all this, be responsible for such accidents as eye color. The biggest difficulty is seeing how Aristotle might account for natural teleology. To Aristotle, there could not have been any such history: the universe not only has always existed and will always exist, it has been and will be just the way it is, with all its species of organ- isms.

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So explanations of the purpose of organs that turn on survival value are ruled out. Unfortunately, some of his errors in biology were more influential than these accurate observations; the most famous of them is his endorsement of the idea that some animals are spontaneously gener- ated, e. These look to be different tasks, and it is not clear how Aristotle himself meant to connect them.

In fact, he mostly pursues them separately. Aristotle, in order to turn what seems to have been a purely geometrical model into a physical one, added spheres to the Eudoxan total, and each of these was to have its motion explained by appeal to an unmoved mover. The result was a total of 47 or 55 unmoved movers there is some confusion over the arithmetic. The question under consider- ation here is: what is imported by the notion of being, all by itself?

What follows from the claim that something is? It has been plausibly claimed that they are not continuous expositions of doctrine but expo- sitions of argument, sometimes on opposite sides of the same question, without resolution. The general position, essentially stated in book IV, is that anything whatever that can be can only do so on the basis of its enjoying some relation or other to a privileged set of beings, the substances: a quality such as a color can only exist by being a quality of a substance, so that the substances turn out to be the existence-makers.

This much Aristotle might have said back in the Categories. But in Metaphysics VII he turns to the question: what, after all, is a substance? To settle the question whether Platonic Forms or Aristotelian individuals are rock-bottom beings or substances, to what can we appeal? Lots of different things will count as substances, so the question becomes: which of them has the best credentials?

The first of these three is the weakest candidate, although it is not excluded altogether. The third, the fact that a thing is a composite of matter and form, is seen as derivative. So the form of a thing is left as its primary substance, what primarily makes it count as a substance. But the individuals referred to as primary substances back in the Categories are now composites of matter and form, and once we make this fact about them derivative, we weaken or even destroy their claim to be primary substances. On the face of it, if there were any such thing as a pure form that had no admixture of matter, this would have the strongest claim to being a substance, a rock-bottom being.

And this sounds a good deal more like Plato than like the Aristotle of the Categories. But this is where the metaphysics of these books seems to fail to come to a stable position: Aristotle seems to be going in different directions at different junctures. There are many possibilities: perhaps Aristotle is here pointing toward his own unmoved movers as the primary sub- stances, supposing that they are matterless forms. Then the individuals of the Categories are demoted. Or perhaps Aristotle thinks he has a way of making the fact that an individual is a form—matter composite less damaging to its claim to be a substance.

Some including the present author see in the very lack of resolution, the open-endedness, of these books something very exciting: a great philosopher at work, without dog- matic answers. Ethics There are four books in the Aristotelian corpus devoted to ethics; the authorship of one, the Magna Moralia, is in great dispute, and the treat- ise On Virtues and Vices is universally declared spurious, but the remain- ing two, the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics, are generally thought to be genuine, and a smaller consensus would make the Eudemian the earlier of the two.

Comments here are confined to the Nicomachean Ethics as standardly printed. Happi- ness is not here to be construed as a subjective feeling of well-being, but as human well-being itself. The role of these latter activities in happiness overall is a matter of some dispute: sometimes Aristotle seems to paint a comprehensive picture in which both figure, while at other times he seems to place exclusive emphasis on contem- plation compare NE I with X. Aristotle differs from Plato in the Republic in insisting that a minimum of external goods is a prerequisite for human well-being. But he rejects hedonism, one of whose advocates was Eudoxus and one of whose strongest enemies was Speusippus.

But he devotes more time to refuting the arguments against hedonism than he does to refuting hedo- nism itself, and the two discussions of pleasure EN VII 11—14, X 1—5 reflect differing attitudes toward hedonism: in the latter, Aristotle seems to reject hedonism on the ground that pursuit of pleasure as a goal, rather than the activities in which one takes pleasure, is bound to be frustrated.

The purpose of studying ethics is, he thinks, to make ourselves good, but Aristotle supposes that we already want to become good: he is lecturing to male Greeks who have been well brought up and have come of age. The account of excellence or virtue he offers locates each virtue in between two opposed vices: the simplest example is courage, which is a mean between the two opposed vices of cowardice and rashness. The last is the best and stablest. Politics The closing chapter of NE is an introduction to politics, not exactly to the Politics, which is a collection of treatments originally separate, but plainly Aristotle thought of ethics and politics as continuous disciplines.

Slavery is natural because some humans are naturally suited to be living tools, which is what slaves are. The subjection of women is natural, because men are naturally more fit to rule than women. And a citizen is defined as a participant in government, someone entitled to hold office. Aristotle does not envisage representative democracy; he is talking about those who may actually rule in the polis.

Books IV—VI go into some detail about these V is a historically rich discussion of revolutions, their causes and prevention, very Machiavellian in tone. It is not the first, but none earlier has sur- vived. Poetics Looking at all the Aristotelian treatises, the ratio of influence to size in the case of the Poetics is the greatest: it is tiny and fragmentary but of enormous historical importance.

It was at some point organized into two books; the second, on comedy, is now lost although a sketch of it may survive in the so-called Tractatus Coislianus. Tragedy is defined chapter 6 in terms of the representation or imi- tation by actors in poetic speech of a serious action in its entirety that by means of pity and fear achieves the catharsis of such emotions.

Epic chapter 23 represents the same sort of thing but in narration, at greater length, and in a fixed verse-structure. Influence Aristotle has been one of the most influential philosophers of all time, sometimes beneficially and sometimes harmfully. Bibliography Writings Aristotelis Opera, five volumes, ed. Bekker Berlin: W. Bourke Born in Thagaste, sixty miles south of the Mediterranean coast, Augus- tine of Hippo — ce was the first important Christian philoso- pher.

Since his writings are very extensive, he is also the most prolific African author. Augustinian philosophy has been influential in every century of Western civilization see Rist, Son of a pagan father Patricius and a Christian mother Monica , he was not baptized as a child. Four years of classical education were followed by advanced studies in at Carthage, where he eventually taught rhetoric. He fathered a son Adeodatus by an unnamed mistress in and read the Hortensius written by Cicero, which stimulated his first interest in philosophy Confessions III, 4, 7; cf.

Bourke, In he sailed from Carthage to Rome in search of a career in the heart of the Roman Empire. Not yet a Christian, Augustine was an auditor in the religion of Mani third century ce , which taught that two great cosmic forces, good and evil, competed for power in the universe as well as within each person see Brown, , chapter 5.

Plagued by doubts about this cosmic meta- physical dualism but still nominally a Manichean, he was appointed to teach rhetoric in Milan, where he encountered a group of Christian scholars headed by Bishop Ambrose and Simplicianus, who sparked his interest in the relation between Platonic philosophy and Christian the- ology. Owing largely to his study of plato and Plotinus, he was converted to Christianity and baptized by Ambrose in In , after the death of his mother, he returned to Africa, where he set up a monastic center for meditation, teaching and dictating to students and scribes many dialogues and treatises.

While visiting Hippo now Annaba in Algeria in , he was ordained priest by Valerius, who needed a preacher who spoke Latin. After the death of Valerius in , Augustine himself became bishop of Hippo. His major works were composed during the following thirty-five years. Bourke invading Goths for details on his life, see Brown, ; Bourke, ; Rist, These works represent a rethinking by Augustine of Platonic philosophy, influenced by his reading of the Old and New Testaments in the Bible Battenhouse, ; Gilson, The great works — the Commentary on the Psalms, The Trinity, Literal Meaning of Genesis, and the City of God — are primarily theological in content, but they also include many philosophical sections.

Since Augustine does not present his philosophy as a methodical or organized system but rather as discrete insights into the meaning of wisdom as the highest grasp of both speculative and practical truth, the following seven key views are chosen to represent the essence of Augus- tinian philosophy. Another nature is in no way changed with respect to place but only in regard to time, namely the soul.

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And there is a third Nature that can be changed neither in respect to place nor time: that is God. These natures of which I have said that they are mutable in some way are called creatures. The Nature that is immutable is called Creator. The three-level theme appears throughout the writings of Augustine. Reacting from Manichean dualism, Augustine decided that evil is a lack or failure in being or action, not a positive entity. Two different appli- cations of this triadic ontology are found in the City of God.

Book V, 9 describes a descending order of causality. God is the ultimate cause of all change but is Himself unmoved. Created spirits angels and souls are real causes but are divinely moved from above. Augustine does not offer a discursive rational proof for the existence of God that starts from some aspect of the physical world. Bodies do not provide a sufficient base for such reasoning. It is by turning from itself to look upward that the human soul discovers God. Rationes: eternal and seminal The Latin word ratio has several meanings for Augustine and it is not easy to find the proper English equivalents.

In Augustinian psychology ratio reason means the gaze of the soul aspectus animae ratio est, Soliloquies I, 13; BW I, looking for understanding. In another meaning the term ratio usually in the plural is used more objectively to name the eternal exemplars rationes aeternae of all things and truths like Platonic Ideas which Augustine finds in the creative Mind of God see 83 Questions, p.

Still another sort of rationes formal reasons exist in all creatures, giving them their specific character as individuals. Such seminal reasons are all created at the beginning of time, but they may develop into existing realities at any point in time Trinity III, 8, 13—19, 16; EA —3. Throughout the Literal Meaning of Genesis all explanations of creation involve this distinction. This sort of statement has been used to make Augustine a foe of scientific evolution.

Actually he would not have been surprised to learn that new species appear to arise by change from earlier ones. All he requires is the recognition that all species are eternally known to God, whatever their time of arrival in the universe. Several early works argue that the human soul is the container of eternal truths, and so immortal Solilo- quies II, 13, 23; BW I, The Immortality of Soul, written in , has several arguments for such immortality, but Augustine was not enthusi- astic about this work when he reviewed it in Retractationes chapter 5. Most distinctive is the treatment of sensing.

Here and in Book VI On Music , sense perception is called activity, not of bodies affecting the soul since the lower cannot move the higher but of the soul actively recording the changes that it observes in its body. Augustine is not skeptical about the veracity of most sense observations. Memory is viewed as a very distinc- tive function of the soul. Along with understanding and willing, memory becomes part of a triad of psychic functions in the later writings, notably in Confessions Book X and Trinity X, 17— Awareness of self is a key feature of memory in its experience of past, present, and future.

Freedom of choice or decision arbitrium is a special feature of the soul as willing. More recent disputes about divine predestination have been much influenced by Augustine; but these theological discussions go beyond the scope of philosophy. Divine illumination of the mind The most debated topic among interpreters of Augustine is the theory of divine illumination. Augustine contends that, just as the eyes need physical light so that the soul can see visible objects, so the human intel- lect requires an immaterial light of the mind to make thought objects and truths intelligible.

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It is in this highest vision that divine illumination shines. Its objects include the meanings of numbers and mathematical concepts such as unity and equality Free Choice II, 8, 22—4. Other examples of such objects are justice, faith, and goodness. The intellectual light is available to all persons, not simply a few favored ones such as the mystics Confessions XIII, 3, 4; 31, However, interpretations of the working of this illumination differ widely. The Thomistic view that the light is really the agent intellect is most unlikely. Most plausible of all is the interpretation holding that God guides the mind in its primitive acts of judgment.

Time as measured in the mind The opening sentence of Book XI of the Confessions stresses the contrast between time and eternity. Some interpreters see Sorabji, minimize the importance of the subjective view of time in the Confessions. Certainly Augustine recognized the objectivity of historical times. In any event, he has influenced many modern approaches to the nature of time.

Ancient philosophers usually were eudai- monists, stressing happiness as the ultimate end of a good life. In the early work, The Happy Life 5, 33 , happiness is equated with the attain- ment of wisdom. Bourke worldly magnificence, honors, physical beauty — are not guarantors of happiness or moral goodness.

Only God, the supreme Wisdom, brings ultimate satisfaction. While Augustine recognizes the value of moral laws Confessions X, 29, 40 , his ethics is not legalistic. The four great virtues of ancient philosophy — prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice — are adopted by Augustine as affective parts of charity, the love of God. Augustine speaks very openly about the iniquities of his early life in the first books of the Confessions see also Enchiridion 18—22; EA —9. His view that every lie is a sin is also very strict, but he admits that there may be circumstances justifying concealment of the truth On the Psalms 5, 7; EA — Some of this ethical severity is owed to his effort to show how much he is indebted to divine forgive- ness see Bourke, Two cities: terrestrial and celestial Although the societal and political philosophy of Augustine is most fully developed in the City of God see Burleigh, , the theme of two dif- ferent societies of men is already evident in The True Religion 26, 49 , where those who love God are the pious and those who love inferior goods are impious.

Augustine takes Jerusalem to mean the vision of peace. Dods Edinburgh, —6. Series Latina Turnholti: Brepols, —. Schaff New York: Scribners, — Oates New York: Random House, Bourke Indianapolis: Hackett, Battenhouse, R. Bourke, V. Brown, P. Burleigh, J. Clark, Mary T. Gilson, E. Lynch New York: Random House, Markus, R.

Rist, J. Sorabji, R. This is as Berkeley would have wanted it; he clearly viewed the thesis that esse est percipi aut percipere to be is to be perceived or to perceive as his central philosophical insight, one which would revolu- tionize philosophy. However, he would be dismayed, if not surprised, to see the extent to which his idealistic system is still commonly regarded as unacceptably counterintuitive. Berkeley was in his own lifetime often dismissed as a skeptical purveyor of paradoxes.

Nothing could have been further from his intentions; Berkeley saw his idealism as being recon- cilable with common sense and, more importantly, as providing a weapon against both skepticism and atheism. Berkeley was born in near Kilkenny, Ireland. After several years of schooling at Kilkenny College, he entered Trinity College, in Dublin, at age He was made a fellow of Trinity College in three years after graduating and was ordained in the Anglican Church shortly there- after.

At Trinity, where the curriculum was notably modern, Berkeley encountered the new science and philosophy of the late seventeenth century, which was characterized by its hostility towards Aristotelianism. Berkeley, however, was never satisfied for long with any received opinions, no matter how up to date; he immediately began to exercise his sharp critical faculties on the works of descartes, locke, Malebranche, Newton, hobbes, and others.

I do not pin my faith on the sleeve of any great man. Berkeley saw Locke and the Cartesians as sharing a commitment to a general picture with particular qualifications in each case which we might call representative mechanist materialism. According to this view, there are two sort of beings in the world, spiritual beings minds and material beings bodies. Other apparent secondary qualities color, taste, sound are not intrinsic qualities of bodies themselves, but are explained in terms of the effects that bodies have on perceivers.

In perception, the immediate object of awareness is an idea, a mind-dependent item. However, the sensory idea represents a mind-independent material object to us, thus allowing us to medi- ately perceive the material object which caused that idea. Berkeley regarded representative mechanist materialism as perni- cious in that it was conducive to atheism and led immediately to skepti- cism. In its commitment to matter, it allowed the existence of something mind-independent, and something which might be thought to be God-independent as well, thus laying the groundwork for the denial of the existence of a Christian God.

Downing representative of reality at all? Berkeley saw a strikingly simple solution to these difficulties: abandon matter and construct a metaphysical system from spirits minds and their ideas: matter or the absolute existence of corporeal objects, hath been shewn to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of all knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief strength and con- fidence.

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And surely, if by distinguishing the real existence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowing them a subsistence of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thing is explained in Nature; but on the contrary a great many inexplicable difficulties arise: if the sup- position of matter is barely precarious, as not being grounded on so much as one single reason:.

Principles, section Berkeley provided an initial glimpse of his mature metaphysics in his first important published work, An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision. Most obviously, Berkeley intended this work to address an ongoing debate on the question of how distance is perceived by sight, and indeed the New Theory became an influential work in the psychology of vision.

Berkeley also, however, sought to establish a conclusion that is directly relevant to his idealism: that the objects of sight and touch are hetero- geneous. Berkeley argues that what we see is something ideal, mind- dependent, quite distinct from what we touch New Theory, sections 43— By , however, Berkeley was prepared to propose and defend his full idealistic system.

On the one hand, he conducts a negative campaign designed to demonstrate the incoherence of materialism; on the other, he seeks to show positively the workability of his idealist system. Both the positive and negative pro- grams, while not ultimately conclusive, are compelling and continue to reward detailed philosophical scrutiny. Of course, the representative mechanist materialist would respond to this argument by introducing a distinction between mediate and imme- diate perception, noting that on his view ordinary objects are perceived mediately, while we immediately perceive only ideas, thus avoiding the conclusion.

In effect, Berkeley devotes much of the rest of the Principles to pointed criticism of the sort of representationalism that permits this response. Most importantly, he argues that because an idea can only be like another idea, we cannot suppose that ideas represent material objects by resemblance. In addition, Berkeley devotes the introduction to the Principles to an influential attack on Lockean abstract ideas, arguing that abstract, general ideas cannot be formed in the way Locke sometimes seems to suggest, by stripping away particularizing features of ideas of particulars, leaving an intrinsically general idea.

Physical things, or bodies, are congeries of ideas. The order of nature consists in the regularities amongst our ideas, and is guaranteed by the goodness of God himself a spirit , who causes our ideas of sense. Downing order of ideas, the grammar of nature. A distinction between real things and imaginary ones chimeras can be made in terms of the vividness and orderliness of the ideas which constitute real things. Berkeley was dismayed by the reception of his immaterialist philo- sophy, and in fact composed the Dialogues in an effort to gain a broader audience for his views. His disappointment, however, did not discourage him from further philosophical work.

In , while completing a four- year tour of Europe as tutor to a young man, George Ashe, Berkeley composed De Motu, a tract on the philosophical foundations of mechan- ics. After his continental tour, Berkeley returned to Ireland and resumed his position at Trinity until , when he was appointed Dean of Derry. At this time, Berkeley began developing his scheme for founding a college in Bermuda.

He was convinced that Europe was in moral and spiritual decay, and that the New World offered hope for a new golden age. Having secured a charter and promises of funding from the British Parliament, Berkeley set sail for America in , with his new bride, Anne Forster. Berkeley argues here that the purposes of language include the guiding of action, that this may be accomplished without each word suggesting an idea, and that language which successfully guides action is thereby meaningful.

In he was made Bishop of Cloyne, and thus he returned to Ireland. It was here that Berkeley wrote his last, strangest, and best-selling in his own lifetime philosophical work. Siris has a threefold aim: to establish the virtues of tar-water a liquid prepared by letting pine tar stand in water as a medical panacea, to provide scientific background supporting the efficacy of tar-water, and to lead the mind of the reader, via gradual steps, toward contemplation of God.

Although Berkeley retains the basics of his idealism in Siris, neo-Platonic influences produce a work of a very different tone from that of the Principles and Dialogues. Berkeley died in , shortly after moving to Oxford to supervise the education of his son George, one of the three out of seven of his children to survive childhood. Despite the mostly uncomprehending response accorded to his metaphysical views by his contemporaries, his influence on Hume and Kant was considerable, his critique of his predecessors continues to shape our understanding of them, and his idealism is one of the enduring positions on the map of Western philosophy.

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Winkler, Kenneth P. Gotama lived in north-east India at a time of lively religious and philosophical debate. The prestige religion then was Brahmanism, an early form of Hinduism administered by Brahmins, the upper, priestly class of a fourfold system of sacred classes, and based on a sacred canon of oral texts, the Veda. The Upanis. This group came to include the Buddhists. Their goal was to find true and lasting happiness through a proper understanding of the nature of reality and an appropriate response to it. Apart from the Buddhists, some were Materialists, who denied any form of survival after death, including reincarnation, which Brahmanism had come to believe in.

The Materialists sought a life of simple, balanced pleasures. The Sceptics denied the possibility of human beings gaining knowledge of ultimate matters. Though brought up in comfort, in his twenties he came to ponder on human frailty — ageing, sickness and death — and was inspired by the sight of a calm saman. One night, when aged around thirty-five, he is said to have finally become a Buddha, through the power of his own meditation. He first attained progressively refined levels of lucid trance, through careful observation of breathing-related sensations. First, he is said to have remembered several hundred thousand of his past lives.

Second, to have traced other beings as they died and were reborn, noting that the nature of their rebirth depended on the quality of their karma. He went on to share his insights with many disciples, the more committed of whom were usually ordained in the order of monks or nuns that he instituted. His disciples would practice the path mapped out by him so as to attain similar insights and trans- formations for themselves, which they also used in teaching others.

Yet the Buddha was aware that the mind could easily filter out aspects of direct experience, misinterpret it due to preconceived ideas, and jump to unwarranted conclusions from very little experiential evidence.

He therefore also emphasized that: 1 The mind must be carefully calmed and refined, by meditation, to get closer to direct experience, unbiased by moods, preferences, fears, and habits. His prag- matic bent comes in as regards what truths he saw as worth teaching to others Harvey, b. Some questions he answered directly, some after clarifying their nature, some after a counter-question, but others he set aside unanswered Woodward, , pp.

The Buddha refused to affirm any of the propositions contained in these questions, seeing concern over them as a time-wasting sidetrack from moral and spiritual development. He also rejected the questions as implicitly post- ulating an essential, unchanging Self that was eternal or non-eternal, finite or infinite like its world, identical with or different from the body, and had some particular destiny after death.

As the Buddha saw no evi- dence for such a Self, he saw questions implying its existence as, in a sense, meaningless Collins, , pp. On the topics of the ten questions, he seems to have seen the world as without any discernible beginning, and as going through a series of cosmic cycles; he also talked of thousands upon thousands of world-systems spread out through space. He seems to have accepted some kind of changing life-principle that is primarily mental but usually interdepen- dent with the body Harvey, , a, pp.

On the liberated person, he did not accept that such a person was destroyed after death, and he implied that, beyond any rebirth, however subtle, and beyond time, some form of inconceivable liberated state existed Harvey, a, pp. The Buddha accepted some form of the doctrine as he felt he had experiential evidence for it.

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Life in all such realms was finite — though the lifespan of hell- beings, and particularly the gods, could be huge — and was followed by some other form of rebirth. Rebirth as a human was seen as a rare and precious opportunity for moral and spiritual growth. The gods were capable of such growth, but their long lifespan meant that they were liable to forget that they were mortal, and so neglect to seek liberation. Indeed, the Buddha did not accept the idea of a creator of the world, since the world, and even the gods, pro- ceeded according to natural laws. While Brahmanism taught something similar, it tended to be primarily concerned with action which was ritually correct or incorrect.

The Buddha saw the moral aspect of an action as its key factor. By contrast, the Jains focused on the overt side of the action. Action that was motivated by greed, hatred, or delusion, or was intended to harm a being, was seen as unwholesome, and as there- fore generating unpleasant karmic results. Action that was motivated by greedlessness including meditative calm , kindness, or wisdom, or was intended to genuinely benefit a being, was seen as wholesome and as generating pleasant results.

Such results included the form of rebirth, certain character traits, and the subjective impact of some events, but it was not held that everything that happened was due to karma Woodward, , p. A human was seen as a relatively free agent who, while affected by environment and character, could initiate new action not fatalistically fixed by past events or actions. The Buddha showed a considerable concern for ethics, in the form of the cultivation of wholesome actions or virtues, and the systematic restraint and transcending of unwholesome ones Harvey, , pp.

A set of five ethical precepts were given to his disciples. These were undertakings to avoid a injuring living beings as all sentient beings share a dislike of pain and a like of happiness , b taking what is not given, c sensual misconduct, such as adultery, d lying, and e intoxication. In the case of monks and nuns, many more training rules were added in order to develop a life of balanced, mindful sense-restraint, including complete celibacy. Harvey discusses the dynamics of Buddhist ethics as applied to various issues. For those who were ready to benefit from them, the Buddha taught the Four Ennobling Truths Harvey, , pp.

This craving is seen to cause future rebirth, and thus re-sickness etc. One who has fully experienced this becomes an Arahat, and at death will no longer be reborn. These all reinforce one another. The Buddha advocated that, after calming the mind, a disciple should engage in careful experiential investigation of the processes making up body and mind. In the world and persons, he dis- covered no unchanging substances, physical or mental, just streams of interacting processes or dhammas, all of which were limited in various ways, and thus dukkha.

This claim is not, as such, a straightforward denial of such a Self, though such a denial is implied. Moreover, he saw it as leading to much suffering for oneself and others, being the root of self-ishness. So an Arahat is one who has destroyed this conceit, by seeing all as not-Self, yet has a strong, calm, open, balanced empirical self, free of such limitations as craving.